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The emergence of the term, 'the informal sector' must be understood in
the context of the concern with development in general. Early hopes
that the modern enclaves of the ex-colonies would grow apace, and
would absorb the majority of the labour force, were soon dashed. The
failure of this 'modernization' process to absorb significant proportions
even of the annual net additions to the labour force, together with the
failure of the rural areas to play the role of infinitely adaptable, passive
labour reserves, soon led to the emergence of acute problems of
urbanization. This brought growth rates of urban labour forces far
exceeding the capacity to create 'modem sector' jobs. Analysers began
speaking of an unemployment problem, and the more cautious spoke of
an underemployment problem. Eventually, the difficulty of defining
and identifying these concepts, and of integrating them into a broader
conception of the process which was creating them, led to the
identification of a 'sector' of the economy which incorporated all of
the problems of underemployment and unemployment in one complex
and fluid socio-economic structure.' While this reformulation had the
undoubted advantage of cutting short the endless and involuted
academic debate about what was unemployment or underemployment,
and just how involuntary either had to be in order to be 'real' it did
nothing in and of itself to establish this new concept as anything but an
essentially descriptive term whose analytic significance has yet to be
established.
In order for this concept to attain analytic value it is necessary that it
be shown that it represents a part of the economy which has its own
dynamic of development, which responds differently to certain
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socio-economic changes arid which generates different types of changes
than the other sectors, from which it is distinguished.
This means that the fact that the 'sector' in question may be
low-income, poorly capitalized or inward looking cannot serve as a
definition of it. The definition must assess the significance of these
particular characteristics, with reference to the process which has
produced them.
The Problem of Definition
There are essentially two bases on which to build a sectoral analysis of
an economy. One entails the identification of different modes of
production in the Marxist sense, and concerns itself with the
articulation of these modes of production. The other sees the problem
in terms of a discontinuity within the capitalist mode of production in
which different sectors of the capitalist economy relate to each other in
an unequal manner.
The first alternative was long discussed in terms of 'traditional' and
'modern'. This lent itself to views which saw undeveloped, backward
areas impeding the progress of modernisation through their
economically irrational cultural and social structure. A much more
promising approach sees the problem in terms of an interaction
between different modes of production in which various modes adapt
to each other, each becoming dependent on the other and each losing
its identity and independence to some degree.
The modes of production referred to here involve on the one hand, a
capitalist sector deeply integrated into an international economy, and
on the other, one of a variety of pre- or non-capitalist modes, each
more or less deeply transformed through its relations with the former.
The form which this symbiosis takes is historically specific to a degree,
in that it depends on the resource base and the level of the forces of
production of the capitalist sector, on the socio-political framework
within which capital operates, on the extent of its accumulation and
local growth, and on the nature of the non-capitalist mode of
production with which it interacts. Nevertheless, the question arises
whether beyond this historical specificity, there is a common pattern to
be discerned.
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The second basis for a 'sectoral' analysis has been developed by a
variety of economists who have focused on the imperfections in the
market, which have to exist if sectoral differences were to be anything
other than pure reflections of differential productivities, directly
related to differences in the level of the forces of production.
Parts of this debate are again echoed in the Marxist debate. Hence the
issue is whether the values (in terms of embodied labour) exchanged in
the market may be systematically unequal beyond the superficial
equality of their market prices. The issue is clearly important since it
determines whether the differentials between different groups are
merely the result of differential productivities, and different costs of
reproduction of labour or whether they are also due to an 'inequitable'
system of valuation. If it is the former, the problem can be dealt with
by raising the physical productivity of those lagging behind. If it is the
latter, there would also need to be sufficient control of the 'market' by
the lagging sections of the economy to ensure that the benefits of
greater productivity were not simply alienated through the exchange
relationship.
Ultimately the question is of interest because it bears on the question
of accumulation and on the possibilities of developing the forces of
production. It is clearly of great importance to decide to what extent
the small scale sectors of the economy, which include all of the most
desperately poor among their number, are themselves engaged in a
process of accumulation and capital deepening, and to identify
correctly those forces which are constraining that development at
present. There is little doubt that mobilization of resources, and hence
accumulation, on a broader front is essential if current patterns of
development are to be broken. Unfortunately, it is equally clear that
these very patterns of development are limited by international
developments which any one country will be hard-pressed (or
powerless?) to alter.
The tentative framework of this paper assumes that many small scale
operators are engaged in a process of production and of technological
development but that their ability to develop cumulatively over
extended periods is limited: by their being exploited through the terms
of trade; by their dependence on large scale industry for inputs (often
illegally obtained); and by the fact that when the markets they serve
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grow beyond a certain size this will not be a gradual but accelerating
stimulus to further development of the forces of production. Instead it
will trigger a discontinuous shift to 'international' technology which
will incorporate this market by virtue of its efficiency and/or its market
power, the latter based on effectively unlimited access to capital and on
the establishment of brand name products through heavy advertising.
The net result of this situation is an appearance of virtual stagnation
among petty producers, though a more dynamic analysis would
possibly reveal a process of growth and destruction. Certainly the very
sketchy data presented here for Tanzania can do no more than give a
rough indication of the consistency of its findings with such a scenario.
Further analysis of this data which is now in progress will enable some
further light to be thrown on these issues, but ultimately it is clear that
detailed historical studies of the development of particular industrial
sectors will be required if this process of growth and destruction is to
be more clearly understood.
The critical issues of the debate emerge in several parts: what are
current income differentials and to what extent are these merely a
reflection of differential productivities or differential costs of the
reproduction of labour; and secondly to what extent is accumulation of
surplus, and hence the development of the forces of production and of
productivity, taking place in the 'exploited' sector, if such a sector can
be identified.
Low Income Wage Earners
What income differentials exist in the urban areas of Tanzania? The
differentials revealed by the survy2 were large, even within the wage
earning sector. The top quintile of wage/salary earners received 53.6 per
cent and the bottom quintile 6.6 per cent of the total wage bill. This
disparity increased substantially when non-wage earners and the
unemployed were included. With these groups included, the top
quintile received around 56 per cent of personal incomes. What sorts of
income earning activities yield the very lowest incomes? The evidence
suggests that these are wage earners, clustered in certain parts of the
2 The data presented here are drawn from M.A. Bienefeld and R.H. Sabot, National
Urban Mobility, Employment and Income Survey of Tanzania, 1971, (NUMEIST)
Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, vols. I-IV, 1972.
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service sector, casual wage earners spilling over into a few other
industrial areas, and self-employed. What it is hoped to do in this brief
discussion, is to identify possible explanations for this pattern and
further, to make a few tentative remarks concerning the apparent
possibilities of accumulation and growth in various parts of this rather
heterogeneous group.
If we look first at the wage-earners, it is important to note that those
with the lowest incomes were extraordinarily concentrated in certain
sub-sectors. At the time of the survey, the minimum wage in Dar es
Salaam was Shs 170 per month. Six per cent of all wage earners earned
less than Shs 150. But 22 per cent of those employed in shops, hotels,
bars or domestic service fall in this category. This meant that 76 per
cent of these very low wage earners in Dar were to be found in these
four sub-categories of service. For the six 'up-country' towns the
pattern was similar, if somewhat less pronounced. The remainder of
those earning less than the minimum wage were widely scattered over
the other industrial sectors. Almost half of them were casual
employees. In addition, within these lowest groups more than 50 per
cent of workers received no fringe benefits of any kind, while for other
wage earners comparable proportions lay well below 25 per cent.
By way of explanation one can point out that all of the lowest income
jobs (ignoring casual non-service workers for the moment) involved the
sale of labour power in direct contact with the consuming customer -
i.e. labour which was not mediated through embodiment in a
commodity, and in the case of domestic servants, labour which was also
not purchased in order to produce surplus value. This means that in all
of these activities, output, and hence 'productivity', tend to be closely
identified with the amount of time spent at work. Productivity
increases are hard to achieve, and, if achieved, hard to establish, so that
income changes based on the development of productivity are less
likely. If other industries raise productivity but do not pass all of the
'benefits' of such increases on to the consumer through cheapened
commodities, then a form of 'unequal exchange' will develop which
discriminates against the service workers described here. The resulting
income differentials are sanctioned by the fact that the establishments
in which the lowest wage earners work are small, and not effectively
subject to wage and social security legislation.
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Finally those working in these areas are further hampered by the
relatively unskilled nature of their work. This, combined with the great
difficulty of organizing or unionizing workers whose jobs are physically
scattered, exposes them to the full force of labour market competition.
The large number of applicants who regularly offer themselves for
domestic service jobs in Dar at very cheap rates is merely one very
visible part of that process.
As to casual wage earners, it should be pointed out that these
overlapped substantially with employment in the above economic
sectors. After construction (37 per cent), domestic service had the
highest proportion of casual employees. Often this involved casual
labour contracts offered by employers in order to escape the extensive
social security arrangements attendant upon regular employment. In
addition, a set of 'casual' jobs was found in industries involving irregular
work. In these cases the use of casual labour allowed the industries to
shift the cost of this irregularity on to the wage earners, emphasizing
the weakness of the bargaining position of unskilled labour in a surplus
labour situation.
The significance of casual labourers in this context lies precisely in the
fact that they represent an area of the economy where employers still
find it possible - or advisable - to treat labour as a homogeneous
undifferentiated commodity to be purchased without regard to
turnover rates or the attendant questions of training, skill, quality
control and commitment to the job or firm. The advantage, such as it
is, of this kind of labour market, lies in the fact that it reduces labour
to a truly variable cost, which can be geared to demand requirements
on a daily basis.
This kind of hiring practice, only too familiar from colonial days, has a
technological basis. It is not feasible in most pre-capitalist, or pre mass-
production enterprises, and it ceases to be sensible in very highly capital
intensive operations where the benefits of stable, experienced workers
outweigh the costs involved in paying the necessary premium to achieve
such stability. In Marxist terms this reflects a change in emphasis to the
extraction of relative, rather than absolute, surplus value.
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However, while many industries move away from such labour practices
for most of their workers, casuals often continue to be used in a fringe
of more occasional jobs, through which the costs of demand
fluctuations can continue to be partially passed on to the workers. In
conclusion it might be noted that there are forms of sub-contracting
which may at times be used to achieve the same ends as the use of
casual labour, with the added disadvantage to the worker that he not
only bears the costs of irregularity of demand, but he is effectively
removed from what legal protection workers (i.e. employees) may have
been able to obtain, and the common interests which tend to bind him
to his fellow workers are dissolved. Instead he is pitted against each of
them in relentless competition. Recommendations to extend
sub-condacting as a means of encouraging 'informal sector' activities
ought to be seen in this light.
Self-Employment
A substantial proportion of those earning less than the statutory
minimum wage were found to be self-employed. Indeed almost half of
such activities yielded incomes of less than Shs 150 per month.3 On the
other hand, a quarter yielded incomes of Shs 350 and more, and 10 per
cent produced incomes of at least Shs 1,000 per month. This
emphazised the obvious point that the self-employed are not a
homogeneous group, whose position in the economy could be
characterized in an undifferentiated manner.
The fact is that the truly marginal persons eking out a meagre income
were here lumped together with entrepreneurs accumulating capital. It
was clearly necessary to separate these groups, and to look in particular
at the two extremes, namely the 45 per cent who earned less than Shs
150 per month and the 11 per cent earning Shs 1,000 and more.
For six distinct types of self-employment - crafts and manufacture,
construction, street-trading, hotel and bar keeping, house rental and
farming - more than one in three participants earned less than Shs 150
3 Income figures for the self-employed were marred by a high rate of non-response,
for some groups as high as 50 per cent. The figures are presented in detail in M.A.
Bienefeld, The Self-employed of Urban Tanzania, IDS Discussion Paper no. 54,
IDS, 1974.
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per month, and in house rental and street-trading the proportion was
more than fifty per cent. At the other end of the spectrum shopkeepers
included a large proportion (35 per cent) who earned at least Shs 1,000
per month and who could therefore possibly be accumulating some
capital. In addition, 10 per cent of craftsmen were in this position, but
in all other groups the proportion was well below that level.
In order to begin to locate each of these sub-groups in the urban
economy, and thus to begin an analysis of what factors account for
their present circumstance and their potential development, it is useful
to divide them into three groups - crafts and manufacture; retailing
services, including street-trading, shopkeeping and bar-keeping; and the
provision of accommodation, including construction and house rental.
Each of these areas has its own problems and possibilities. It should be
noted that the distribution and services group overlaps with the sectors
including the bulk of the lowest income wage earners.
The first group, crafts and manufacture, represents potentially the most
important set of activities. This is where (material) use.values are
produced and where the forces of production experience their most
extensive development. This brings in its train the need for more
extensive facilities for finance and distribution, and generates the
surplus which accelerates the process of accumulation and the rate of
productivity increase. Unfortunately, only a small proportion (10 per
cent) of those engaged in this set of activities earned incomes suggesting
that they 'might' be engaged in a process of capital accumulation and of
the development of the forces of production.
To gain some perspective on this observation it is necessary to step out
of the confines of the static survey picture. The manufacturing sector in
Tanzania has grown substantially since independence, from a very small
beginning. This growth involved the development of a considerable
number of local enterprizes, invariably owned and operated by
members of the local Asian or European communities. This was a sign
that accumulation was taking place, and since the communities in
question had originally derived their capital largely from trading, it also
suggested the existence of a mechanism through which trading profits
were utilized to accelerate the accumulation of surplus in production.
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The 'local' activities were most vigorously extended in the areas of food
processing, clothing, and othermore minor activities like
furniture-making, soap-making, etc. On the whole such operations were
not technologically sophisticated, relied primarily on local inputs and
produced largely for the local (East African) market. Certainly their
existence constituted prima facie evidence that capitalist development
was not only possible, but that it was in fact taking place, and that local
entrepreneurs could play a role in this process.
Nevertheless the expansion of international capital has meant that
today, most branches of manufacturing are dominated by firms which
are extensions of the international production network, either in terms
of their technology, their management and/or their ownership. What
this has meant for local entrepreneurs has depended on the way in
which the now dominant firms entered the economy. Although this
process has been very little studied in Tanzania, certain general
observations can be attempted.
The manner and the circumstances of this penetration of foreign capital
may itself yield some valuable insights into Tanzania's much discussed
'socialism'. The fact that the 'local' industrial and commercial sectors
were entirely dominated by minority communities has to be considered
a factor which facilitated the entry and expansion of international
capital. Certainly, if the majority community was to gain some control
of these sectors within a reasonable period, the establishment of
international firm subsidiaries operating with state participation quite
clearly emerged as a very attractive alternative. Indeed it was this
alliance between the state and international enterprise which created
the situation in which the relative economic power of the minority
communities came flot to be reflected fully at the political level.
Of course this argument does not imply that international capital
penetrates only economies where such preconditions exist, nor is it
meant to suggest that Nyerere's socialist endeavours have not been
genuine and well-conceived. What it does help to clarify is the reason
why it has been possible to move along this apparently socialist road
when the political basis for such a policy seems woefully inadequate.
The answer this suggests is that it is merely state participation which
has been supported. This also explains why 'socialist' measures which
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extended beyond this limited aim became the focus of opposition
viz, workers' participation, the Party Guidelines of 1971, the 1974
Income Tax Act, the creation of a mass-based movement towards
'Ujamaa'.
If these factors do something to explain the manner in which foreign
capital entered the economy, one must be clear also that there were
often good economic reasons why external capital was given preference.
Local business was often family based and hence restricted in its
potential growth by the limits imposed by the family's size.
Furthermore the interdependence of various enterprises combined with
the cohesion of the minority communities and the limited extent of the
market to make entry by other entrepreneurs all but impossible and to
thake oligopolistic practices inevitable. When one adds that with this
kind of 'local' ownership the outflow of capital was already a
significant problem, though its precise dimensions are naturally not
known, the apparently higher level of productivity of foreign producers
was seen as a virtually unqualified blessing. Indeed, questions as to
whether these potential benefits were realized or, whether the
consumer, or indeed the society, reaped the benefits, were rarely asked.
Certainly there were cases, such as the soap industry in Kenya, grain
storage, beer brewing and the baking of bread in Tanzania, where even
purely economic analysis would have been hard pressed to justify the
heavy investment in centralized facilities which has occurred.
Unfortunately, even those international producers who bring no
economic advantage often thrive. The reasons why, once admitted,
foreign producers displace local producers even if they have no
economic (i.e. efficiency) advantage, must be sought on the one hand,
in their use of advertising, packaging and surface finishing, which have
particular leverage due to the 'more modern is better' mentality of the
'imported civilization', and on the other hand, in the ability of the
'modern' product to undersell its competitors (even if only
temporarily) and to force the hand of the government - especially if it
is a partner - to give it concessions to this end.
This process determines the limited development potential of the small
scale productive sector. It extracts surplus from this sector through
exchange, and hence limits the extent to which accumulation takes
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place in that sector. When such accumulation takes place nonetheless,
and when this leads to capital deepening and the introduction of capital
on a larger scale, such developments will often be subjected to the
introduction of a very much more capital intensive technology. This
may occasionally happen through a local entrepreneur, but more often
it involves the direct participation of the government and/or a foreign
firm.
The effect is similar regardless of the form it takes: the linkages upon
which the original enterprises were based are broken, and they are
rarely fully replaced by others; the surplus generated in this new
process is not partially drained off to pay for the technology; the
'saving' of labour due to the greater efficiency is a curse, not a blessing;
the capital (liquid) which has been accumulated and embodied in this
activity (realized, non-malleable capital) is virtually turned to scrap; the
capacity to develop the technology employed is greatly impaired, if not
destroyed. Though the surplus created by the new process may be
greater than that generated before, and even though this surplus may
sometimes be greater net of surplus drain, the relevant comparison is
with the surplus that would häve been created by the activity in
question and all of its attendant linked activities, if the process of
capital deepening had not been interrupted.
If these notes may be said to sketch the outlines of the factors which
determine the upper limits which inhibit local accumulation, two points
should be stressed before continuing. The fact that distinct minority
groups controlled local manufacture in Tanzania was locally important,
but it is not being suggested that the argument depends upon this
circumstance. The groups which control capital are always distinct in
that they constitute a class. The significance of this particular case lies
in the weakening of the symbiosis between local capital and the
controllers of the state apparatus, so that the usual, limited conflict of
interest between the state and international capital was less
pronounced. It need not be pointed out that the intrusion of foreign
capital occurs even when such a background does not exist, and one
may add that in Tanzania, as elsewhere, many local capitalists have
resolved their dilemma by linking up with foreign manufacturers - and,
if possible, with the government as well. However, the Tanzanian
pattern of ownership may well be important in explaining the high
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degree of 'apparent autonomy' of the Tanzanian state, in that it explains
the divorce of the state from local capital.
The second point is that the entry of foreign capital obviously does not
always displace local production, and indeed at times it is responsible
for its beginning - i.e. the production of local cloth led to the forward
linkage development of numerous clothing manufacturers. The problem
is that any such linked developments are themselves open to the threat
of entry by a much more highly mechanized producer into their
market. Indeed the more successful a local group of producers are, the
more likely it is that the introduction of 'international technology' may
become profitable in the market defined (or created) by them.
The local craftsmen or small scale manufacturers are thus in one of
three situations: they are either pursuing their particular activity as an
essentially temporary expedient; they are producing in the interstices of
a market not reached by an existing 'modern' producer, being therefore
in a rather static situation and limited in the extent to which
accumulation and capital deepening is possible; or they are in an 'open',
growing market moving in a direction where the threat of lethal
competition forces them to seek a foreign firm and/or the government
as a partner in order to survive. In every case the appearance of the
small-scale manufacturing sector that meets the observer's eye, is that
of a rather stagnant, non-accumulating part of the economy.
In the survey this apparent sluggishness of the sector was reflected in
the combination of a generally low level of income and production with
a high degree of stability and seniority among participants. These were
characterized by a concentration of participants (74 per cent compared
to 58 per cent of wage earners) in the mature working age bracket 25 to
49 years; a low proportion 'looking for work' (12 per cent compared to
13 per. cent of wage earners); a high proportion engaged in the activity
for three years or more (67 per cent compared to 47 per cent of wage
earners in their present jobs). This high degree of attachment in the
absence of much evidence of rapid accumulation, reflected the fact that
62 per cent of respondents earned more than Shs 150 per month, and
hence were at least earning the minimum wage. This was particularly
significant in view of the fact that 67 per cent of the total number thus




This group made up almost one half of ail non-wage earners in the
survey. In terms of the previous discussion this is not unexpected, since
this sector is relatively immune to competition from highly centralized,
capital intensive operations, at least at present levels of consumption
and mobility.
It is true that the development of the forces of production must begin
with the accumulation of surplus, and that such surplus may be
öriginally accumulated through trade. Nevertheless, from the
perspective of a national economy and its internal trade and
distribution network, it is useful to view distribution as largely
secondary, with the volume of its business determined, within limits, by
the nature and volume of productive activities generating tradeable,
non-ephemeral commodities. Such a view does not imply that one sort
of activity is superior to another, nor does it deny the possibility that
improved trading arrangements can make a given level of production
more effective in supplying use-values, or that it can stimulate
productive activities more generally. It does mean that an increase in
commodity production is necessary for a sustained increase in
distribution activities, although at the same time it is true that tradeable
commodities that are unable to reach their markets become useless
junk.
The expansion of this sector is therefore limited by the expansion of
the commodity producing sector. Within these limits, competition is of
the nature of a zero-sum game, where a relatively fixed quantity is
being divided between many participants. Therefore, although it is
essential that this sector be flexible and responsive enough to deal with
any increase in the volume of output, it cannot be seen as a major
source of growth.
Nevertheless, this sector is capable of accumulating investible surplus:
more than one third of shopkeepers indicated that they had earned
more than Shs 1,000 in the previous month. This was true even though
more than one half of all shopkeepers refused to disclose their incomes,
and there is reason to believe that those refusing were often high
income earners.4
' The non-response of Asian shopkeepers was particularly high, and they were
clearly the highest income earners in all sub-groups in which they were represented.
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For the 38 per cent (of those disclosing their incomes) who were
earning between Shs 150 and Shs 999 per month, shopkeeping provided
a reasonable income, comparable to that of wage earners, but not
enough to be a source of capital accumulation or even a basis from
which an expansion of inventories and hence of trade could be readily
undertaken. Nevertheless, most of this group had been in the business
for more than three years (71 per cent of all shopkeepers), and were
apparently intending this to be a permanent source of income (only 9
per cent were looking for a job).
Among the shopkeepers there was also a fringe of more marginal
operators, made up of some combination of: the 22 per cent who had
arrived in town during the past three years; the 9 per cent who were
looking for a job; the 13 per cent who had been shopkeepers for less
than one year, and the 27 per cent (of those disclosing their incomes)
who earned less than Shs 150 per month.
Street-traders made up another layer of retailers, existing in the nooks
and crannies left by the shopkeepers. Virtually none of them earned
incomes that might make accumulation of capital a real possibility, but
about half of them (47 per cent) earned incomes over Shs 150 per
month, i.e. incomes comparable to those of wage earners. This is
especially remarkable in the light of two features of this group: its low
educational level and its relative growth. Whereas 41 per cent of wage
earners have no more than four years of schooling, 80 per cent of the
street-traders fall in the same category. And whereas 17 per cent of all
non-wage earners were under 25 years, 31 per cent of the street-traders
were under 25. On the other hand over half (53 per cent) of all
street-traders earned less than Shs 150 per month; almost one in four
(24 per cent) was looking for a job; 30 per cent had arrived in town
within the last three years; and the 24 per cent who had been pursuing
this activity for less than one year constituted a large proportion in
comparison with other non-wage activities (average 15 per cent). Even
so, it was also true that at least 30 per cent of the total number were
persons who had been thus engaged for more than one year, even
though they earned less than Shs 150 per month.
66
Finally bar-keeping was rather similar to street-trading, though it
provided incomes of at least Shs 150 per month for a somewhat larger
proportion (60 per cent instead of 47 per cent) of its participants. Again
there were none in the sample who appeared to be in a position to accumulate
capital on a significant scale, though the high proportion earning
reasonable incomes, combined with the fact that no less than 57 per
cent of this group had been engaged in this particular activity for at
least three years, suggested a stable and relatively attractive source of
income.
In this activity there was also a marginal group made up of a
combination of: the 40 per cent who earned less than Shs 150 per
month; the 29 per cent who had been engaged in this activity for less
than one year; the 26 per cent who had been in town less than four
years; and the 17 per cent who were looking for a job.
It appears then, that the retailing sector was arranged in three tiers. At
the top were primarily non-African shopkeepers who earned high
incomes and many of whom were in a position to accumulate capital.
Though the uses to which such resources were put could not be
determined, it was suested that many local manufacturing activities
were probably originally financed from capital accumulated through
trading activities.
The second layer of this sector afforded reasonable income to
particip ants, but these were not of sufficient size to make accumulation
and growth a likely possibility. Furthermore, given the limits imposed
on the development potential of this sector by the scale of productive
activities elsewhere in the economy, the net effect of any such potential
growth would result primarily in a change in the ranking order of
individual participants in the sector, and concentration at the higher
levels would mean displacement or marginalization at the lower levels,
though this might well entail a shift of resources from consumption to
investment.
The implied competition between these two parts of the retailing sector
accounts for the discrimination so generally practised against the more
irregular traders. In Tanzania it appears reasonable to assume that the
relative lack of harassment of such traders, which led in 1973 to the
complete abolition of urban trading licences, has been related to the
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Asian domination of shopkeeping activities.5 By the same token, the
increasing role played by government-controlled retail outlets augurs ill
for the irregular traders in future.6 It should be noted that there seems
to be no general justification for a policy restricting irregular traders.
They provide a legitimate service by effectively decentralizing the
retailing structure and only if competition led to substantial irregularity
of supplies, or to problems with shady business practices employed by
the more mobile and hence less accountable traders, would there be a
case for restriction or control. Alternatively, to the extent that such
competition cuts retailing margins it transfers income from those
engaged in this sector to those purchasing the commodities so traded,
and this results in lower wages and incomes in this sector, and a
lowering of the cost of reproduction of all labour. This indicates why
the more established traders are normally seeking protection from such
competition, and why other groups apart from the irregular traders
often encourage competition.
The competition between the lower two groups in the sector - namely
the established and the marginal street traders - is similar. While the
issuing of trading licences limits the competition which street-traders
constitute for shopkeepers, it also protects the established street-traders
from unlimited competition from below. In urban Tanzania this
pressure has been less severe than elsewhere, partly because rates of net
migration have been more moderate, partly because the growth in
urban formal sector employment has kept pace over long periods with
the growth in the urban labour force.7 It is a common observation that
street-traders of all kinds have been noticeably less numerous in Dar es
Salaam than elsewhere in larger African cities. On the other hand the
survey did show that in the retailing sector a substantial number of
50 per cent of shopkeepers in the 1971 survey were Asian, and this included
virtually all of those owning larger shops. NUMEIST, vol. IV.
6 There are recent reports of harassment of irregular traders in Dar es Salaam. See,
for example, 'Tanzania bans maize selling in streets', East African Standard, 24 July
1974.
Dar es Salaam enumerated employment was 29,443 (African: regular and casual)
in 1961 and 67,521 (citizens and casual) in 1969. This represents an increase of 129
per cent over eight years, or just under 11 per cent per annum. Source:
Employment and Earnings, 1962 and 1969.
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marginal (in terms of income) traders existed, and it is likely that they
exerted a depressing influence on incomes in this sector. While this
entailed a benefit to consumers at one level, if it undermines the core of
permanent and established traders who make up the bulk of those
involved in the trade, it may ultimately lead to a destabilization of
retailing. It may also exacerbate the net migration problem by giving
larger numbers of migrants a flimsy toe-hold in the urban economy,
which is just enough to enable them to play the urban lottery and keep
them from returning to the rural areas.
Accommodation
The third major group of self-employed are those who contribute
towards the provision of áccommodation. In general, the situation in
this respect was relatively easy in Tanzania's urban areas. The reason for
this lay primarily in the virtual absence of land-hoarding and
land-speculation following the government's very strict regulations
concerning land-ownership, under the terms of which a title to land
consists merely of a right of occupancy, due to residing on, or actively
working on, a piece of land. Although there has been some abuse of this
system, it has on the whole created a situation in which access to land
has been relatively easy and hence house-ownership relatively
widespread, with 43 per cent of household heads paying no rent, and
with rent payment amounting to no more than 12-14 per cent of the
household head's income for virtually all other respondents, rising to 20
per cent only for the very lowest income earners.
Housing generally played a very important role in terms of social
security. In our interviews both with residents of the poorest areas of
the cities and with wage earners at their place of work, a constantly
recurring theme was the idea that people saved in order to build a
(concrete-block) house, from which they hoped to rent rooms so as to
provide themselves with a steady basic income, especially once they
were retired. That this dream was realistic, is indicated by the fact that
almost 60 per cent of all household heads over 50 years of age owned a
house in the city.
The role of housing income as secondary or retirement income, as well
as the fact that access to such income was very broadly based, emerged
clearly from the survey. Thus almost 60 per cent of reported incomes
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from house rental fell below Shs 150 per month; 85 per cent of those
with such incomes had been in the city for more than ten years; almost
half of those with rental incomes were over 50 years of age; and more
than one-third currently received wage incomes in addition to their
rental incomes.
A further reason for this high degree of decentralization in the
provision of housing accommodation was the fact that much of the
housing so constructed was built by self-help, with the (possible)
assistance of various sub-contractors usually employed on a jobbing
basis.
The work of contractors tended to be irregular as a result, and 22 per
cent of them had worked only three days or less during the previous
week. On the other hand, the work required knowledge and resources
which were not easily acquired, with the result that no less than 71 per
cent of contractors had been in this business for more than three years,
and only 14 per cent had arrived in the city within the past three years
(compared to 42 per cent of wage earners).
Partly due to the irregularity of work, and partly due to the
substitutability of self-help work for contract work, incomes were
reasonable but not high, with virtually no-one earning more than Shs
1,000 per month, but with the majority receiving incomes comparable
to those of wage earners. Nevertheless, this still left 36 per cent with
incomes of less than Shs 150 in the previous month, a fact which
partially explains the symbiotic relationship between wage-employment
in larger scale contracting and this small-scale self-employing
contracting activity. Thus only 27 per cent of contractors had never
held wage employment (this was by far the lowest proportion for any
of the self-employed categories - average 54 per cent), and 33 per cent
were looking for ajob at the time of the interview (average 16 per
cent).
On balance there was little evidence that accumulation, on any large
scale was taking place in this sector. In general, incomes were not large
enough to allow this, although it should be said that relatively small
amounts of capital would be required to enter the construction
industry on a larger scale. But here again the fact that the 'modern'
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sector of this industry was dominated by the Asian community was of
some importance. In a separate study of that industry the author found
that because of the close ties between material suppliers, builders and
architects, an African contractor had little chance of establishing
himself in this sector. The 'modern' sector of the industry was
dominated by non-Africans and the market for large buildings was
controlled by a group of about fifteen firms who operated in a very
'soft' market where competition was more apparent than real, where
tender prices were very volatile and where profit margins were large.
That study further suggested that this problem became worse as
demand for 'modern' buildings grew. But even then there was little
evidence of small local contractors being drawn up by the suction thus
created. Indeed it appeared that unless standards of building were
adjusted and credit facilities and material supplies made available to
smaller contractors, their chances of expanding beyond the boundaries
of the small residential housing market were extremely limited. On the
other hand if a substantial part of the 'modern' sector's demand could
be met by local builders, dealing with much simplified designs and
structures, the effects in terms of saving foreign exchange, the creation
of employment and the encouragement of linkages of various kinds
could be significant.
Conclusions
This paper set out to attempt to come to terms with the concept of the
'informal sector' as a classification of a syndrome of urban poverty. The
tentative conclusion is that the urban poor are crowded into a series of
activities which are highly differentiated in nature but which have in
common one major and dominant attribute: their ability to accumulate
capital to raise the forces of production is both limited by and
dependent upon the activities of the 'modern' sector, as an extension of
the international capitalist system. 'This is because this sector is able to
take over any sphere of production or any market which may be
developed through non-capital intensive activities. In the course of such
an extension of international capital, the growing 'informal' activities
will be destroyed. Though at times others may be generated which feed
into these newly created 'modern' enterprises, a net loss will normally
be incurred in the shift.
It follows that the economic areas in which such 'informal' activities are
located, are those which capital intensive mass production has not yet
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penetrated. This is sometimes due to the nature of the demand being
met - personal services, retail trading, sub-contracting in housing, in
which areas extensive capital intensive production is for the moment
unlikely, and therefore a great deal of (living) labour time is expended
in these activities. But this labour time does not exchange 'equally' in
the market. Rather it exchanges for goods embodying less labour time
(i.e. goods whose prices do not fully reflect the greater efficiency of
their production). This process involves a transfer of surplus to the
'modern' sector, within which this surplus may be shared by the wage
earners involved in the production of such commodities, although this
would apply primarily to industries producing for 'soft' (domestic or
international) markets.
In some other cases such small-scale producers are simply exploiting
particular niches in the market, and in this way have the opportunity to
grow independently, but always subject to the constraint that
international capital and/or technology is capable of intervening to take
over. It may be noted that this possibility is, of course, crucially
dependent on the state of international capital markets, with the
well-known Latin American result, that the cumulative growth of local
accumulation is likely to be more sustained during periods of
international crisis, when international capital is less readily available.
However the Latin American experience also suggests that a change in
this international climate will return one to the status quo ante, almost
irrespective of how far local development has progressed.
At this stage of the work, firm conclusions as to the long-run
implications of the processes identified cannot be drawn, but it would
appear that it is this process and its attendant frequent disruptions of
patterns of accumulation which lie at the heart of the debate
concerning the limits or the 'special' difficulties of peripheral
capitalism. It is this process which stunts the growth of the small-scale
productive sectors: either completely containing it by decapitating any
foray into mass production b parts of this sector through the direct
introduction of foreign, or foreign government (cum foreign
technology) enterprises; or by vastly accelerating the broadly based,
widely linked development of a particular productive activity so that a
very few producers with relatively few employees and few linkages
come to dominate these new activities in a short space of time. In either
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case the small-scale sector remains behind, further weakened. In the
first case some of the most promising enterprises of that sector go to
the wall and the capital invested in them is usually destroyed; in the
second case a few former 'informal sector' entrepreneurs make it, but
the effect is much the same, since, their adoption of the latest
technology also means a discontinuous leap from their previous
technology, and this technology is generally not acquired through
surplus generated in the 'informal sector' but through credit in the
formal sector. It hence represents simply an expansion of the 'formal'
sector within the limits of the resources available from that sector,
rather than additional accumulation generated outside of its confines.
It is for these reasons that detailed observations of 'informal sector'
activities always reveal great vitality, considerable technological
developments and every sign of responsive and adaptable growth, while
the larger picture remains one of a seemingly endless perpet%tation of
the sector and its problems of poverty and low productivity. It is also
for the reasons given, that these two sets of observations are seen to be
compatible. Indeed we should expect to find them wherever an
economy is exposed to open competition from a far more advanced
technology and an expansive international capital market.
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